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Resistance to correctionCognitive insight in schizophrenia encompasses the evaluation and reinterpretation of distorted beliefs and
appraisals. We investigated the neuropsychological basis of cognitive insight in psychosis. It was predicted
that, like clinical insight, cognitive insight would be associated with a wide range of neuropsychological
functions, but would be most strongly associated with measures of executive function. Sixty-ﬁve outpatients
with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder were assessed on tests of intelligence quotient (IQ), executive
function, verbal ﬂuency, attention and memory, and completed the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale, which
includes two subscales, self-certainty and self-reﬂection. Higher self-certainty scores reﬂect greater certainty
about being right and more resistant to correction (poor insight), while higher self-reﬂection scores indicate
the expression of introspection and the willingness to acknowledge fallibility (good insight). The self-
certainty dimension of poor cognitive insight was signiﬁcantly associated with lower scores on the
Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome; this relationship was not mediated by IQ. There were no
relationships between self-reﬂection and any neuropsychological measures. We conclude that greater self-
certainty (poor cognitive insight) is modestly associated with poorer executive function in psychotic
individuals; self-reﬂection has no association with executive function. The self-certainty and self-reﬂection
dimensions of cognitive insight have differential correlates, and probably different mechanisms, in psychosis.© 2009 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. Open access under CC BY license. 1. IntroductionTraditional ‘insight’ in psychiatry is most commonly viewed as a
multi-dimensional construct incorporating awareness of illness, symp-
toms and the need for treatment (David, 1990; Amador et al., 1991).
Individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia frequently disagree with
mental health professionals about the nature of their experiences, and
whether they are in need of psychiatric treatment such as medication.
Such disagreements are generally viewed as reﬂecting poor insight on
the part of the patient in one ormore of these dimensions,which in turn
has been linked to poor medication compliance and then to poor
outcome (Morgan and David, 2004). There is a more recent suggestion
that good insight can have maladaptive consequences for self-esteem
and causes distress (Cooke et al., 2007a,b).
The neuropsychological correlates of traditional insight in schizo-
phrenia have been investigated extensively. While there has been
considerable heterogeneity in the results of these studies (Cooke et al.,PO78), Institute of Psychiatry,
848 0233; fax: +44 207 848
r CC BY license. 2005), a recent meta-analysis (Aleman et al., 2006) has shown that
poor insight is associated with poor functioning in a range of cognitive
domains, including intelligence quotient (IQ), memory and executive
function. There is also some evidence to suggest that the associations
are particularly strong for the set-shifting and error monitoring
aspects of executive function (Aleman et al., 2006).
Recently, Beck and colleagues (Beck andWarman, 2004; Beck et al.,
2004) have distinguished between the traditional approach to insight,
which they term ‘clinical insight’, and ‘cognitive insight’, which is a
form of cognitive ﬂexibility and encompasses the evaluation and
correction of distorted beliefs and misinterpretations. They contend
that a crucial cognitive problem in the psychoses (including schizo-
phrenia) is that individuals are unable to distance themselves from
their cognitive distortions (e.g., ‘there is a conspiracy against me’), and
are also impervious to corrective feedback (Moritz and Woodward,
2006). In contrast, individuals with panic disorder or obsessive–
compulsive disorder are more likely to retain the ability to recognise
that the conclusions they have made were incorrect, and therefore
maintain good cognitive insight.
A lack of cognitive insight in individuals with schizophrenia
contributes to both the impairment of clinical insight, and the
development of delusions (Beck and Warman, 2004). An impairment
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despite feedback from others, may lead an individual with schizo-
phrenia to disagree with others who call their experiences symptoms
of illness; this disagreement is then called an impairment of the
‘awareness of symptoms’ aspect of clinical insight. Poor cognitive
insight, it is then argued, may also lead such individuals to conclude
that their interpretations (appraisals) of their experiences (e.g., ‘there
is a conspiracy against me’) are factually correct (Beck et al., 1994),
contributing to the formation and maintenance of delusions. As in
other cognitive models, cognitive models of psychosis emphasise the
particular role of appraisals in delusional formation and maintenance
(Garety et al., 2007). Recent ﬁndings have highlighted the potential
importance of cognitive insight as a mediator of response to cognitive
behavioural therapy for psychosis (Granholm et al., 2005), with
increases in cognitive insight associated with reductions in positive,
negative and general symptomatology (Granholm et al., 2006).
The Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS; Beck et al., 1994) has two
distinct subscales, self-certainty and self-reﬂection. Poor insight is
characterised by a high degree of certainty in one's (mis)interpreta-
tions, and a lack of self-reﬂectiveness. Beck and his colleagues (Beck
and Warman, 2004; Beck et al., 2008) suggest that the BCIS is an
indirect test of a putative impairment of the ‘higher level’ functions in
schizophrenia, with the process of distancing oneself from highly
salient (delusional) beliefs and having the capacity to view them in
perspective requiring intact executive function.
The objective of this study was to examine the neuropsychological
correlates of both dimensions of cognitive insight in schizophrenia. We
hypothesised that, like clinical insight, cognitive insightwill be associated
with a wide range of neuropsychological functions, but will be most
strongly associated with measures of executive function, particularly
measures of set-shifting and errormonitoring. These aspects of executive
function, as stated earlier, have been found to show most strong
associations with clinical insight (Aleman et al., 2006).
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Sixty-ﬁve outpatients (46 men, 19 women) who met the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition (DSM-IV) (American Psychiatric Association,
1994) criteria for the diagnosis of schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder were recruited
from the South London and Maudsley Foundation NHS Trust. The mean age of the parti-
cipantswas38.9years (range19–65).All participantswereonstabledoses of antipsychotic
medication (51 on atypical and 14 on typical antipsychotics) for at least 3 months prior to
taking part in this study,were in a stable (chronic) phase of illness andwere recruited from
the community (all outpatients). The mean ratings of the participants on the Positive and
Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay et al., 1987) were 16.8 (S.D.=4.9) for the positive
subscale, 18.3 (S.D.=5.0) for the negative subscale and 32.5 (S.D.=6.5) for the general
psychopathology subscale. The study sample was the same as in Cooke et al. (2007a; this
report did not examine neuropsychological data in relation to the BCIS or any other
measure of insight).
After complete description of the study to the participants, written informed
consent was obtained. The study procedures were approved by the Joint Research
Ethics Committee of the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust and
Institute of Psychiatry.
2.2. Clinical measures
Diagnoses were ascertained by a consultant level psychiatrist (DF) using the
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I disorders Research Version (SCID-P;
Spitzer et al., 1994), who also administered the PANSS (Kay et al., 1987) andwas blind to
both the cognitive insight and neuropsychological test scores.
Cognitive insight was assessed using the BCIS (Beck et al., 1994), a 15-item self-
report scale which measures the two dimensions of self-certainty and self-reﬂective-
ness (but not insight into potential neuropsychological functioning deﬁcits). Items are
rated by the participant on a four-point scale from ‘do not agree’ to ‘agree completely’.
The self-certainty dimension is calculated as the sum of six items (possible range 0 –
18), and measures decision making regarding mental products: certainty about being
right and resistance to correction (Beck et al., 1994), for example ‘I know better than
anyone else what my problems are’. Greater self-certainty indicates poorer cognitive
insight (i.e., overconﬁdence in decision making). The self-reﬂectiveness dimension is
calculated as the sum of the remaining nine items (possible range 0 – 27) andmeasures
the expression of introspection and willingness to acknowledge fallibility (Beck et al.,1994), for example ‘If someone points out that my beliefs are wrong I am willing to
consider it’, with a higher score indicating better cognitive insight.
The G12 item of the PANSS (‘lack of judgement and insight’) was collected as part of
PANSS assessment and was subsequently used to assess the convergent validity of the
cognitive insight measures. Clinical insight in this patient sample was also assessed
using the Birchwood insight scale (BIS; Birchwood et al., 1994) and the expanded
Schedule of Assessment of Insight (SAI-E, Kemp and David, 1997). Both of these
measures assess David's (1990) three dimensions of clinical insight, namely (i) the
presence of a mental illness, (ii) the need for treatment and (iii) the identiﬁcation of
symptoms as abnormal. The SAI-E also includes an additional item on awareness of the
social consequences of illness. When administering the BIS, question 4 (“My stay in
hospital is necessary”) was excluded because all patients of this study were outpatients.
The remaining three items from the ‘awareness of the need for treatment’ dimension
were used to calculate a score for this subscale with equal weight to the other two
subscales, allowing a total score to be calculated which has the same range (0–12) as
the full BIS Scale. Questions 7 and 8 of the SAE-I (which assess the level of insight into
the presence of symptoms)were excluded for eight patients, as they did not possess any
symptoms for which insight could be rated. Higher scores indicate better insight on
both the BIS and SAI-E.
2.3. Neuropsychological measures
General intellectual ability was assessed using the full-scale IQ estimate derived
from the two-subtest version of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI;
Wechsler, 1999), which consists of the Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning subtests.
Executive function is a diverse construct, which encompasses a large number of
processes (Godefroy, 2003). A broad battery of executive function tests was therefore
employed to capture this diversity. The tests used (followed by the dependent
variables) were the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST, computerised version; Heaton
et al., 1993) – categories completed, % perseverative errors and % non-perseverative
errors, the Trail Making Test (TMT; Reitan, 1955) – ‘difference score’ (part B time minus
part A time, which controls for psychomotor speed), Brixton Spatial Anticipation test
(Burgess and Shallice, 1997) – proﬁle score, Hayling Sentence Completion test (Burgess
and Shallice, 1997) – proﬁle score, the Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive
Syndrome (BADS; Wilson et al., 1996, 1998) – total score across the six subtests and the
Stroop Colour-Word test (Golden, 1978) – interference score.
Explicit declarative memory (total recall) was assessed using the Hopkins Verbal
Learning Test (HVLT; Shapiro et al., 1999).
Verbal ﬂuency was assessed using the Controlled Oral Word Association Test
(COWAT; Milner, 1975), which measures both phonological and semantic ﬂuency using
letter and category verbal ﬂuency tests respectively. The total number of correct
responses for the three letter ﬂuency conditions was used as the measure of
phonological ﬂuency, while the total number of correct responses for the three
category ﬂuency conditions was used as the measure of semantic ﬂuency.
The computerised Continuous Performance Test, Identical Pairs Version (CPT-IP;
Cornblatt et al., 1988) was used to assess sustained attention. Performance on the CPT-
IP task is indexed by ‘hits’ (responses to match trials) and false alarms (responses to
catch trials). These two scores yield the signal detection index ‘d'Prime’, which
represents the signal-to-noise ratio by measuring the sensitivity of the participant to
the discrimination of targets from catch trials.
2.4. Statistical analyses
The distributions of all measures were inspected using histograms and Q–Q plots to
determinewhether theyapproximatednormal distributions.Non-parametric statisticswere
applied to variables which did not approximate normal distributions. Two-tailed Pearson's
correlations were used to examine relationships between variables which approximated
normal distributions, while Spearman's rank correlations were used when one of the
variables was not normally distributed. The Bonferroni method was used to control for
multiple comparisons, with the standard alpha of Pb0.05 divided by the number of tests
undertaken for each insight variable, to yield a corrected alpha of Pb0.00357.
Following a signiﬁcant correlation between self-certainty subscale of the BCIS and
the BADS total score at a level which survived correction for multiple comparisons, a
forward Wald logistic regression with all cognitive measures entered as potential
predictors and this subscale of the BCIS as the dependent variable was undertaken to
examine the extent to which neuropsychological variables explained separate variance
in self-certainty scores. A linear regression was used to determine whether the
relationship between self-certainty and BADS total score was mediated entirely by
general cognitive ability.
In secondary analyses, we also examined the correlations between insight as
assessed by the PANSS G12 item, the BIS and the SAI-E, mainly with a view to replicate
previous ﬁndings linking poor executive function to poor insight (Aleman et al., 2006).
3. Results
3.1. Data inspection
The three WCST variables, the Stroop interference score and the
Trails B-A timewere not normally distributed. The two BCIS scores, the
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for neuropsychological variables.
Measure N Mean (S.D.) Range
WASI IQ 63 101.42 (16.17) 70–133
Executive function
WCST % perseverative errors 64 21.73 (14.61) 5–68
WCST % non-perseverative errors 64 19.78 (13.27) 1–63
WCST categories 64 3.55 (2.40) 0–6
Stroop interference score 64 −1.47 (10.19) −18.8–46.8
Trails B-A score 64 82.89 (93.13) 2.3–495.4
Hayling proﬁle score 64 5.38 (1.75) 1–9
Brixton proﬁle score 65 5.06 (2.24) 1–10
BADS total score 62 15.98 (3.99) 2–22
Verbal ﬂuency
Phonological ﬂuency (F, A, S) 64 36.69 (11.80) 5–62
Semantic ﬂuency (categories) 64 40.77 (11.60) 18–75
Sustained attention
CPT d′ 64 0.86 (0.60) −0.1–2.4
Memory
Hopkins verbal learning total correct 64 20.45 (5.65) 8–32
WASI –Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. WCST –Wisconsin Card Sorting Test.
BADS – Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome. CPT – Continuous
Performance Test.
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measures approximated normal distributions.
3.2. Insight variables
The descriptive statistics for insight measures and the correlations
between cognitive and clinical insight measures are presented in
Table 1. The PANSS G12 insight item was modestly but signiﬁcantly
correlated with both BCIS dimensions: positively for self-certainty and
negatively for self-reﬂectiveness. Both correlations were in the
expected direction, with higher PANSS G12 item scores (poorer
clinical insight) associated with scores indicating poorer cognitive
insight (higher self-certainty and lower self-reﬂectiveness). Both BCIS
subscales were also signiﬁcantly correlated with the total scores of the
SAI-E and BIS measures of clinical insight in the expected directions
(all rN±0.4, P≤0.001) though the strength of the correlations varied
for the two subscales and appears somewhat stronger for the BCIS
self-certainty scale. No insight measures were signiﬁcantly correlated
with either duration of illness or age of onset (all PN0.1).
3.3. Associations between insight and neuropsychological functioning
The descriptive statistics for neuropsychological variables are
presented in Table 2. The correlations between the two BCIS dimensions
and the neuropsychological test scores are set out in Table 3.
The self-certainty BCIS dimension was signiﬁcantly negatively
correlated with the BADS total score at a level which survived
correction for multiple comparisons (Pb0.003). This relationship is
presented in Fig. 1. This association was in the expected direction of
poorer cognitive insight (higher self-certainty) being associated with
poorer neuropsychological functioning. The self-certainty BCIS
dimension was also negatively correlated with Brixton test proﬁle
score at the single test level (Pb0.05), but this did not survive
correction for multiple comparisons.Table 1
Descriptive statistics for insight measures and the correlations (Pearson's r) between
cognitive and clinical insight.
N Mean (S.D.)
BCIS self-certainty 65 7.4 (3.8)
BCIS self-reﬂectiveness 65 14.1 (5.1)
PANSS G12 65 3.1 (1.4)
Birchwood insight scale
Insight into symptoms 65 2.86 (1.31)
Insight into illness 65 2.52 (1.38)
Insight into treatment 65 3.21 (1.07)
Total 65 8.63 (2.96)
The expanded schedule of assessment of insight
Insight into symptoms 57 3.86 (2.68)
Insight into illness 65 5.20 (2.53)
Insight into treatment 65 1.58 (0.70)
Insight into consequences 65 1.35 (1.01)
Total 57 12.30 (5.52)
Correlations N BCIS BCIS
Self-
certainty
Self-
reﬂectiveness
PANSS G12 65 0.375** −0.296*
Birchwood insight scale
Insight into symptoms 65 −0.420** 0.480**
Insight into illness 65 −0.354** 0.276*
Insight into treatment 65 −0.486** 0.169
Total 65 −0.543** 0.400**
The expanded schedule of assessment of insight
Insight into symptoms 57 −0.418** 0.294*
Insight into illness 65 −0.438** 0.391**
Insight into treatment 65 −0.298* 0.181
Insight into consequences 65 −0.321** 0.254*
Total 57 −0.457** 0.428**
*Pb0.05; **Pb0.005.There were no signiﬁcant relationships between the self-reﬂec-
tiveness dimension and any of the neuropsychological measures. The
strength of the self-certainty–BADS correlation (r=−0.375) was
compared to that of the self-reﬂectiveness–BADS correlation
(r=0.020) using Fisher's Z transformations. It was found that they
were signiﬁcantly different (Z=2.25, P=0.024).
As the BADS is composed of six subtests, exploratory post hoc
correlations were undertaken to determine which subtest was most
strongly associated with self-certainty. These analyses indicated that
the only BADS subtest to show a signiﬁcant relationship with self-
certainty was the modiﬁed six elements test (rho=−0.335, Pb0.01).
Speciﬁcally, it was the number of times that the rules were broken (upTable 3
Correlations between BCIS dimensions and the neuropsychological functioning.
Neuropsychological measure N BCIS BCIS PANSS
G12
item
Self-
certainty
Self-
reﬂectiveness
WASI IQ 63 r −0.136 0.031 −0.254
Executive function
WCST % perseverative errors 64 rhoa −0.037 0.087 0.126
WCST % non-perseverative errors 64 rho −0.195 −0.046 0.055
WCST categories 64 rho −0.016 −0.086 −0.149
Stroop interference scorea 64 rho −0.094 −0.002 −0.200
Trails B-A scorea 64 rho −0.010 0.167 0.239
Hayling proﬁle score 64 r −0.214 0.114 −0.243
Brixton proﬁle score 65 r −0.261b 0.052 −0.220
BADS total score 62 r −0.375c 0.020 −0.301b
Verbal ﬂuency
Phonological ﬂuency (F, A, S) 64 r −0.102 0.072 −0.260b
Semantic ﬂuency (categories) 64 r −0.004 −0.089 −0.194
Sustained attention
CPT d′ 64 r −0.185 −0.020 −0.107
Memory
Hopkins verbal learning test 64 r −0.116 0.040 −0.111
WASI –Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. WCST –Wisconsin Card Sorting Test.
BADS – Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome. CPT – Continuous
Performance Test.
a Spearman's rank correlations used where variable not normally distributed.
b Pb0.05.
c Pb0.00357 (Bonferroni-corrected alpha level).
Fig. 1. Relationship between BADS total score and BCIS self-certainty.
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associated with self-certainty score (rho=−0.332, Pb0.01), rather
than the number of tasks attempted (rho=−0.060, ns). This suggests
that it was not perseveration on tasks which was associated with high
self-certainty, but rather the inability to follow the rules of the task.
In order to determine the extent to which the BADS explains
unique variance in self-certainty scores, a logistic regression was
undertaken with all neuropsychological variables entered as potential
predictors. As expected, BADS total score was the most signiﬁcant
predictor (Pb0.01), explaining 10.5% of the variance on its own. WCST
% non-perseverative errors also entered the equation as a signiﬁcant
predictor (Pb0.05), explaining an additional 8.2% of the variance
(total 18.7% variance explained).
In order to determine whether the signiﬁcant relationships between
self-certainty and executive function could be explained in terms of
general cognitive ability, a regression was computed where current IQ
was entered ﬁrst, followed by BCIS self-certainty score. The ﬁrst model
was signiﬁcant, indicating a positive relationship between BADS total
score andWASI IQ (R2=0.478,Pb0.001). The addition of self-certainty in
the second model improved the model signiﬁcantly (R2 change=0.065,
F change=8.166, P=0.006) indicating that the relationship between
self-certainty and BADS score was not entirely mediated by IQ.
While examining the relationships between clinical insight as
assessed by the PANSS G12 item and neuropsychological functioning,
a relationship between lower BADS total score and poorer clinical
insight was found (Pb0.02), as was a relationship between poorer
clinical insight and lower verbal ﬂuency (FAS score, Pb0.05) (see
Table 3). Relationships were also found between lower insight on the
illness into symptoms dimension of the BIS and poorer performance
on three executive function measures (Hayling proﬁle score,
r=0.266, P=0.03; Brixton proﬁle score, r=0.264, P=0.03; BADS
total score, r=0.256, P=0.04), and between lower insight on the
insight into illness dimension and lower Brixton test proﬁle scores
(P=0.292, P=0.02); other BIS dimensions were not correlated with
any neuropsychological variables. However, none of the clinical
insight–neuropsychological associations survived correction for mul-
tiple comparisons. The dimensions of insight on the SAI-E as well as
the factors derived from the factor analysis of the BIS and the SAI-E
items (as described in Cooke et al., 2007a) did not correlate
signiﬁcantly with any neuropsychological variables.
4. Discussion
Cognitive insight has recently emerged as an important aspect of
research on insight in schizophrenia, in part due to data suggestingthat it is a moderator of how individuals respond to cognitive
behaviour therapy for schizophrenia (Granholm et al., 2005, 2006).
This study set out to investigate the neuropsychological correlates of
the BCIS, the only measure of cognitive insight currently available.
Signiﬁcant relationships were found with two of the six tests of
executive function. Signiﬁcant correlations were found between lower
scores on the BCIS self-certainty dimension and higher scores on both
the Brixton spatial anticipation test and the BADS; the latter survived
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons and remained
signiﬁcant after controlling for IQ. Lower scores on this BCIS dimen-
sion indicate better decision making regarding mental products – i.e.,
less overconﬁdence about the reality of one's experiences, and lower
resistance to correction. The relationships found therefore indicate
a modest association between higher cognitive insight and better
executive functioning, in line with unpublished data (Grant and Beck)
cited by Beck et al. (2008).
Probing further into the self-certainty–executive function relation-
ship with post hoc analyses showed that, of the six BADS subtests, the
relationship with self-certainty was strongest for the ‘modiﬁed six
elements’ subtest. This subtest is a simpliﬁed version of the original
Shallice and Burgess (1991) six elements test, and involves partici-
pants following instructions to do three tasks (dictation, arithmetic
and picture naming), each of which is divided into two parts. The
participant is required to attempt at least something from each of the
six subtasks within a 10-min period. In addition, participants are not
allowed to do the two parts of the same task consecutively. Marks are
awarded for the number of tasks attempted in 10 min, and deducted
when the rules of the task are broken. The post hoc analyses revealed
that it was the number of rule-breaks, not the number of tasks
attempted, which was associated with the self-certainty score. It
therefore appears that poor cognitive insight is associated with the
inability to form and follow a strategy, rather than the tendency to
perseverate on a particular element of the test.
Poor cognitive insight was not associated with another measure of
perseveration, the proportion of perseverative errors on the WCST.
Perseverative errors arise through a failure to recognise that a
previously successful strategy is now producing errors – i.e., poor
error monitoring. This ﬁnding is important in the context of a
neuropsychological model of poor clinical insight, as it has been
suggested that a failure to detect errors may be particularly important
in the apparent unawareness of the ‘incorrectness’ of symptoms in
individuals with schizophrenia (Larøi et al., 2000). If the same was
true of the neuropsychological basis of cognitive insight, one would
expect poor cognitive insight to be associated with greater persevera-
tion, which was not the case in this study, thus casting doubt on Larøi
and colleague's suggestion. The scores on the other three putative
tests of executive function employed in this study, namely, the Stroop
test, which primarily assesses selective attention, the Trail Making
test, which indexes mental ﬂexibility and the Hayling Sentence
Completion test which measures response initiation and suppression,
were also not correlated with self-certainty. It is unlikely that this was
due to a ﬂoor effect, or a limited range of scores on these measures
(see Table 2). It therefore appears that the relationship between the
self-certainty dimension of cognitive insight and executive function is
not driven by a speciﬁc cognitive process such as perseveration, but
rather is related to the general ability to form and maintain a strategy
for problem solving. This is also suggested by the ﬁnding of the
regression analysis showing that non-perseverative, rather than
perseverative, errors explained additional variance (to that explained
by the BADS scores) in self-certainty dimension of cognitive insight. It
is important to point out that, although increased perseverative errors
are often cited as the most characteristic aspect of the performance of
individuals with schizophrenia on WCST (Koren et al., 1998), the
results of a meta-analytic review suggest that both perseverative and
non-perseverative type errors are committed on this test by patients
with schizophrenia (Li, 2004).
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other cognitive domains investigated, namely general intellectual
ability, verbal ﬂuency, sustained attention and memory. This supports
a degree of speciﬁcity in the relationship between executive function
and the components of poor decision making regarding mental
products which make up the self-certainty dimension of cognitive
insight: jumping to conclusions, overconﬁdence about being right and
resistance to correction. Recent data suggest that general intellectual
ability is signiﬁcantly associated with the ‘jumping to conclusions’
(JTC) bias (Van Dael et al., 2006), although this study did not measure
executive function speciﬁcally. Further, JTC, investigated in depth by
Garety et al. (2005), is one of the components of cognitive insight that
is designed to be measured through the self-certainty dimension of
the BCIS. Our ﬁndings suggest that poor executive functioning may
contribute more strongly than general cognitive ability to individuals
with schizophrenia making over-conﬁdent decisions.
Self-reﬂectiveness, the expression of introspection and the will-
ingness to acknowledge fallibility (Beck et al., 1994), was not
signiﬁcantly associated with any neuropsychological measure
included in this study. Speciﬁcally, the correlations between BADS-
self-certainty and BADS-self-reﬂectiveness were signiﬁcantly different
from each other, suggesting a neuropsychologically different pathway
between the two dimensions of cognitive insight.
Other recent data also point to the relative independence of the
self-certainty and self-reﬂectiveness dimensions of cognitive insight.
Speciﬁcally, higher self-certainty (lower insight), and also higher self-
reﬂection (higher insight), has been observed in delusion-prone
college students (Warman and Martin, 2006; delusion-proneness
assessed with the Peters Delusion Inventory, PDI; Peters et al., 1999).
More recently, psychotic individuals with active delusions have been
reported to show lower insight on the self-certainty dimension (over-
conﬁdent) but greater insight on the self-reﬂection dimension than
those without active delusions (Warman et al., 2007). Taken together,
these and our ﬁndings suggest that self-certainty and self-reﬂection
are independent dimensions at both the clinical and the neuropsy-
chological levels. However, while delusion-proneness or presence of
delusions in studies byWarman and colleagues (Warman and Martin,
2006;Warman et al., 2007) related to both greater self-certainty (poor
insight) and greater self-reﬂection (good insight), poor executive
function signiﬁcantly related only to poor insight on the self-certainty
dimension in our study.
Clinical insight, assessed on the scales which are modestly
correlated with cognitive insight in our and other data (e.g., Pedrelli
et al., 2004), also showed positive associations with scores on some
tests of executive function in this study. This is consistent with
previous data on this topic (Aleman et al., 2006) andmay suggest that
self-certainty dimension of the BCIS, despite measuring aspects of
insight that differ considerably from clinical insight measures based
around the medical model, has similar neuropsychological correlates
to that observed previously for clinical insight measures. Although the
strength of the correlation between symptoms insight on the BIS and
the BADS proﬁle score was somewhat lower, it was not signiﬁcantly
different from that observed for the self-certainty dimension of the
BCIS.
Lastly, we found no association between the duration of illness and
self-certainty or self-reﬂectiveness dimensions. In a longitudinal
study, Bora et al. (2007) observed lower insight on both self-certainty
and self-reﬂectiveness dimensions in acutely ill psychotic patients and
reported some improvement in self-certainty but no change in the
self-relectiveness after recovery of psychosis. Our ﬁndings seem to
suggest that both overconﬁdence in judgements and impaired self-
reﬂectiveness are fairly stable during the chronic course of the illness
(Garety et al., 2007; Warman and Martin, 2006).
This study has some limitations. First, this was a cross-sectional
study and does not indicate the direction of causality in the observed
insight–neuropsychology relationships. Second, the BCIS is a self-report measure and may not be very suitable for cognitively impaired
patients.
In conclusion, the ﬁndings of this study demonstrate a modest
association between the self-certainty, but not self-reﬂection, dimen-
sions of cognitive insight and executive function in psychotic
individuals which is not mediated by IQ. The self-certainty and self-
reﬂectiveness dimensions of cognitive insight may have differential
correlates, and possibly differential causes and mechanisms, in
psychosis.Acknowledgements
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